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ABSTRACT

The First Amendment historically has been interpreted to
provide greater and greater protection to more and more
forms of expression. The notion of an originalist First
Amendment has never commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court and is unlikely to do so. Instead the
development of the First Amendment has followed a
common law trajectory. As the reach of its protections
expands, so to do its attractiveness for arguments that may
be more accurately located elsewhere in the Constitution's
text. Such opportunism is a predictable, even necessary
consequence of the First Amendment's common law
development, and the Supreme Court tacitly endorses such
opportunism by consistently declining to issue saving
constructions to laws that implicate the First Amendment.
While both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito have recently
offered anti-opportunism readings of the First Amendment,
neither is likely to garner a majority. The common law First
Amendment-and the opportunistic use of it-will
continue apace.
The common law approach that focuses on the
evolution of precedent over time has much to recommend
as a critique of originalism and a defense of interpreting the
U.S. Constitution as an evolving document.' This approach
argues against the possibility of a completely faithful

1 This essay draws mostly on the common law approach developed by
David A. Strauss. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION]; David A.

Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law]; David A. Strauss,
Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter Strauss, Freedom of

Speech].
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originalist approach.2 This is especially true regarding the
development of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment over time, which, this approach claims, is
marked by three central principles: recognition of the core
importance of the right to criticize the government, the
distinction between high-value and low-value speech, and
distinguishing among differing regulations on speech. 3
Indeed, many of the arguments on behalf of the common
law view are formidable.
However, even if agreed upon, these principles are
not self-executing in their case-specific applications. While
there does exist a widely shared general narrative of the
First Amendment's development, it is not the product of
only one perspective. 4 Instead, it is imperative to
understand the presence of two competing traditions of
First Amendment interpretation: one libertarian in
orientation, the other egalitarian.5 Thus, in spite of the
2 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION,

supra note 1, at 58 (noting that "the
evidence we have of the original understandings of the First
Amendment does not support the idea that the framers mean to
establish protections of free expression comparable to those with which
we are familiar today," and mentioning the specific categories of
seditious libel, blasphemy, and defamation).
' Id. at 53-55.
4 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech,
124 HARv. L. REV. 143, 144-46 (2010).
5 Id. at 144 ("In the first [egalitarian] vision[,] ...
free speech rights
serve an overarching interest in political equality. Free speech as
equality embraces first an antidiscrimination principle: in upholding the
speech rights of anarchists, syndicalists, communists, civil rights
marchers, Maoist flag burners, and other marginal, dissident, or
unorthodox speakers, the Court protects members of ideological
minorities who are likely to be the target of the majority's animus or
selective indiffer-ence."). See also id. at 145 ("The second [libertarian]
vision of free speech, by contrast, sees free speech as serving the
interest of political liberty. On this view[,] . . . the First Amendment is

a negative check on government tyranny, and treats with skepticism all
government efforts as speech suppression that might skew the private
ordering of ideas. And on this view, members of the public are trusted
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desirability of a single overarching narrative, the common
law approach must contain enough narrative richness to
credit the contributions of each tradition.
Additionally, proponents of the common law
approach must pay special attention to considerations of
scope. The common law approach provides a more accurate
reading of the significant expansion of free speech rights in
the United States over time than does any originalist or
textualist account. This fact, however, also raises questions
of what limits should exist on what is covered by the Free
Speech clause. Both the libertarian and egalitarian
traditions can provide coherent responses. However, where
these traditions agree, one may still argue that free speech
arguments are being used opportunistically precisely
because of the high success rate of speech-protecting
arguments. 6
Part I of this essay provides a brief overview of the
common law approach. This overview will outline
arguments for the common law approach and note the
reasons why this approach is particularly useful in
examining the First Amendment. These reasons are both
prudential and philosophical.
Part II examines the differences between the
libertarian and egalitarian visions of the First Amendment.
Of special concern are the subtle differences in how each
vision would characterize the classical narrative of
development from World War I era cases to the Supreme
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.7 While each
perspective notes the important contributions of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Learned Hand, the
libertarian vision tends to stress Hand's influence on
to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and government is
forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons.").
6 Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger &

Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002).
7See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss1/5
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Holmes' shift in perspective from his opinion for the Court
in Schenck v. United States8 to his dissent in Abrams v.
United States9 Further, the libertarian vision tends to focus
more attention on pre-World War I "libertarian
radicalism."o In each example, egalitarians hew more
closely to Supreme Court decisions and prefer a more
streamlined narrative generally.
Part III engages the notion of "First Amendment
opportunism" and its compatibility with the common law
approach." Implicit in the opportunism argument - and
explicit in other critiques - is the idea that a common law
approach leads to an untethered First Amendment, one that
can be utilized to bolster the prospects of positions whose
more obvious defenses come from outside the parameters
of the First Amendment.12 This examination will focus on
recent dissents where a majority of both the libertarian and
egalitarian wings of the Court were in agreement.
Taken as a whole, the common law approach is
superior practically and theoretically. The evolution of how
the Supreme Court addresses free speech claims is
testament to this superiority. A level of First Amendment
opportunism does exist, but this need not be a problem so
long as both the libertarian and egalitarian visions are given
their due.

8 See

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

9 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
10DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 15 (1997).

1 Schauer, supra note 6, at 196-97 ("But if instead we see the First
Amendment as intrinsically, fundamentally, or even just largely as an
artifact of a constitution that is itself a common-law document, then it
would be hard to make sense of the idea of the First Amendment, and
arguably of the idea of free speech, apart from what the courts have
made of it, and apart from the necessarily and nonproblematically
opportunistic way of the common law.").
I2 Id. at 192 ("[T]he First Amendment appears to be, in the United
States in the last thirty years, the argument of choice for those who find
that their intrinsically preferred argument is unlikely to prevail.").
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I.

The
Common
Law
Approach
Constitutional Interpretation

A.

Practical Arguments for the Common Law
Approach

to

One prudential argument on behalf of the common
law approach is that it does a better job of explaining our
actual practices than any other perspective.' No single
judicial approach to constitutional interpretation has
consistently held sway, and any accurate historical
treatment must accommodate this reality. Even in a
normative debate, room remains for differences of opinion
within any broad interpretive approach over how to treat
existing precedent.14 The common law approach, by giving
precedent its due, better explains how the Constitution is
interpreted in actuality.
A related argument in favor of the common law
understanding is that it is more workable in practice.'5 By
emphasizing the process of interpreting and applying
precedent, the common law approach stresses the skills
most would expect judges to possess. This is preferable to
approaches, such as originalism, that claim only to be
humbly following the intentions of the framers of the text,
but asks judges to perform complicated acts of historical

13 STRAUSS,

LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 44 ("[T]he

governing principles of constitutional law are the product of
precedents, not of the text or the original understandings. And in actual
practice of constitutional law, precedents and arguments about fairness
and social policy are dominant.").
14This is true of originalism as well. For a recent example, see Justice
Thomas's concurrence in McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring), where he argues that originalist
incorporation of the Second Amendment should occur under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than
under the Due Process Clause.
15 See STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 43.

http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss1/5
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interpretation for which they are not suitably trained.16 The
workability of the common law approach reinforces a
further argument on its behalf: The common law approach
is more justifiable.17 The common law view provides the
best justification for the existing and common practice for
valuing precedent so highly.
A final argument on behalf of the common law
approach is that, contrary to the views of originalists, it
actually does a better job of restraining judges.18
According to the common law approach, arguments linking
non-originalist approaches to judicial activism fail to note
that it is judicial review that is undemocratic, not any given
interpretive approach.' 9 Interpreting original intent (or
meaning) is no less an interpretive enterprise than
interpreting precedents. In fact, the plausibility of the
former typically depends on established precedent serving
as a boundary marking the limits of acceptable
interpretation.20
The arguments for common law constitutionalism
are particularly relevant regarding the First Amendment.
Proponents of the common law approach point to the
1d. at 18-21.
Id. at 43-44.
18Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 879.
1

'9 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 47.

20 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 926-27 ("The notion that the
text of the Constitution is an effective limit on judges is plausible only
if one assumes a background of highly developed precedent. Within the
limits set by precedent, paying more attention to text might indeed limit
judges' discretion. The appeal of textualism as a limit on judges - as
the argument was made, most famously for example, by Justice Black stems entirely from the assumption that the text will be used to resolve
disputes within the gaps left by precedent. If we assume that the various
clauses of the Constitution are to be interpreted in something like the
current fashion, then judges may indeed be more 'restrained' if they
insist on some relatively explicit textual source for any constitutional
right. But that is primarily a demonstration of the restraining effect of
precedent, not of text; the bulk of the restraint by far is provided by
precedent").
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practical impossibility of following any originalist
understanding of the First Amendment.2 1 For example, the
approach of Justice Black, the most explicitly textualist
understanding of the First Amendment, never garnered
majority support in any Court holding.22 The contemporary
understanding of the First Amendment, including now noncontroversial applications of the First Amendment, cannot
be explained in an originalist manner.
B.

Conceptual Arguments on Behalf of the
Common Law Approach

Aside from noting the practical reasons why an
originalist understanding of the First Amendment is
problematic, proponents of the common law view also
allude to its philosophical grounding. This is not to say that
common law constitutionalism is presented as a selfcontained system. However, the common law approach
possesses elements of a philosophical architecture meant to
indicate its adaptability and to parallel the prudential
arguments made in support of it.
For example, one defense of the common law
approach against the charge of indeterminacy is to note
how well its account of the development of First
Amendment law tracks with John Rawls' notion of
"reflective equilibrium." 23 The introduction of this concept
is intended as a description of the outcome of the accretion
of precedent over time insofar as it accurately characterizes
STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 8-9, 29-31.
22 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, 519 (1965)
(Black, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a textualist reading of the First Amendment).
23 Strauss, Common Law supra note 1, at 888 ("The common law
approach captures the central features of our practices as a descriptive
matter. At the same time, it justifies our current practices, in reflective
equilibrium, to anyone who considers our current practices to be
generally acceptable - either as an original matter or because they are
the best practices that can be achieved for now in our society.").
21

http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss1/5
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cases where different perspectives on the First Amendment
are in agreement. To the extent that the evolution of
precedent has guided the understanding of relevant
constitutional language, then this understanding is
something that is arrived at, and a condition that may be
changed by a future decision, much like how Rawls
characterized reflective equilibrium.24 In this manner,
reflective equilibrium is a useful concept to describe the
actual practices of constitutional interpretation.
Common law constitutionalism emphasizes that the
current generation should not be beholden to previous ones,
including the founding generation.25 With adherence to
precedent playing the reflective role, the evolution of First
Amendment standards over time is not to be feared.
Indeed, it is sensible to speak of an established tradition of
expanding First Amendment standards and of the common
law approach as marked by "rational traditionalism." 26
This traditionalism limits overreach by stressing
"humility about the power of individual human reason." 2
By acknowledging the limitation of abstract reasoning and
focusing instead on the solid grounding provided by past
precedent, the common law approach is a traditionalist
account. This emphasis on previously established workable
interpretations is consistent with what is called "bounded
24 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20-21 (1971)

("But this
equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is liable to be upset by further
examination of the conditions which should be imposed on the
contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to
revise our judgments."). Id. at 48 ("As we have seen, this state is one
reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and
he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held
fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).").
25 STRAUSS,

LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 18 ("Most

fundamental of all, originalists have yet to come to grips with the most
obvious and famous issue, one raised by Thomas Jefferson among
others. The world belongs to the living, Jefferson said.").
26 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 891-94.
27STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at
41.
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rationality,"-recognition that reliable outcomes are best
reached by treating some elements of the present
controversy as already settled.2 8
Another theoretical concept is used to explain the
virtue of the common law approach's conventionalismRawls' notion of an overlapping consensus. 29 The notion of
an overlapping consensus refers to the sort of agreement
over basic political principles that are possible even among
individuals who have different beliefs on notions of the
good, or differing comprehensive moral views.3 0 The
common law approach is compatible with the idea of an
overlapping consensus in that both imply a core area of
agreement that is possible even given substantially different
interpretive perspectives. This core provides stability that is
not possible through a simple agreement to respect
differences.31 While disagreements inevitably arise over
how to apply a given precedent, or even over whether or
not a particular precedent applies, this should not distract
from the role of precedent in constitutional interpretation,
an essential component to the core of the constitutional
approach.
Id. at 894 ("In modem terms one might say that traditionalism is a
recognition of bounded rationality. Humans are not perfect computing
machines. People do not have the resources, intellectual and otherwise,
to consider every question anew with any hope of consistently reaching
the right result.") (footnote omitted).
29 Strauss, Common Law, supra note 1, at 907 ("Conventionalism is a
generalization of the notion that it is more important that some things
be settled than that they be settled right. The text of the Constitution is
accepted (to adapt a term used in a related way by its originator) by an
'overlapping consensus': whatever their disagreements, people can
agree that the text of the Constitution is to be respected."). For Rawls's
28

usage, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
30 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 29, at 134-40.

31 Id. at 148 ("The test for this is whether the consensus is stable with
respect to changes in the distribution of power among views. This
feature of stability highlights a basic contrast between an overlapping
consensus and a modus vivendi, the stability of which does depend on
happenstance and a balance of relative forces.").

http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss1/5
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Further, in arguing on behalf of his notion of an
overlapping consensus, Rawls stressed the need for
"reasonable pluralism." 32 Reasonable pluralism is
compatible with the notion of an overlapping consensus to
the extent that the substance of the overlapping consensus
is a set of commitments that are common to all reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. Such a perspective is useful in
making sense of fundamental aspects of the evolution of
First Amendment law, such as the commitment to
protecting core political speech. There is a clear line
connecting the reasonable baseline assertion that the First
Amendment protects core political speech with the reality
that the boundaries of that commitment have been marked
differently at various times.
In short, the common law approach makes two
important contributions. First, it provides a historically
grounded way of understanding how the First Amendment
has been interpreted. Second, it offers a theoretically rooted
basis justifying such a precedent-heavy method of
determining its meaning.
At the same time, each contribution is open to
challenge. The historical development of First Amendment
law may feature a settled general narrative but also
possesses room for important differences in which details as in whose contributions - are emphasized. Even the broad
historical narrative will be related differently depending on
whether it is related by one who sees the First Amendment
through a libertarian or egalitarian lens. 33
The theoretical argument for the common law
approach draws heavily on the historical reality but also
notes inherent benefits to seeing the First Amendment as
properly understood as the consequences of decades of
precedent. However, this view is open to the frequently
made critique that this developed precedent has warped the
32

Id. at xviii-xix.

33 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 144-46.
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actual meaning of the First Amendment. Of particular
potency is the argument that the First Amendment has
become a repository for arguments that are likely to fail if
rooted in other parts of the Constitution that more naturally
match the controversy at hand and thus, grabbing at the
heightened reputation of the First Amendment, are framed
as First Amendment controversies. 34 Each of these critiques
will be taken up in turn.
II.

Competing Narratives of the Development
of the Common Law First Amendment

The common law approach rightly notes that the
First Amendment, as presently understood, is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with a textualist
understanding of the First Amendment.3 5 However, this
alone does not vindicate the common law description. A
careful reading of the common law approach shows that it
permits differing narrative characterizations of how the
First Amendment has evolved.
At one level, judgments regarding the extent to
which a particular case (Abrams, Masses,: or Whitney 37) or
Justice/judge (Holmes, Hand, or Brandeis) is stressed affect
how the overall narrative is constructed. Additional
important questions that color and shade the emerging
narrative of the evolutionary process by which the First
Amendment developed exist within this framework. For
example, when considering Justice Holmes' sizable role,
how should the relationship of his Schenck opinion to his
Abrams dissent be characterized?
Schauer, supra note 6, at 191 ("The arguments selected, however, are
less likely under these circumstances to be selected for their intrinsic
merit than for the likelihood that they will succeed.").
3 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 8-10.
36 See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd,
264 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
n See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
34

http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol9/iss1/5
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Further, should the common law narrative focus
solely on Supreme Court decisions, or ought it take account
of lower-court decisions such as Learned Hand's opinion in
Masses? Emphasizing Masses opens the door to
considering pre-WWI activity in a way that most
proponents of the libertarian view find favorable. In a
similar vein, should the narrative include the contributions
of important legal scholars? For example, an analysis of
Zechariah Chafee's influence on Justice Holmes might
bolster the egalitarian argument on behalf of Holmes'
contributions.
Questions such as these counsel caution in
accepting a given narrative as settled; they do not prove the
futility of the common law approach. In fact, a common
law narrative that wrestles with such questions in good
faith serves as the best reminder that the common law
approach is justified roughly to the extent that it avoids the
originalist assumption that a single, unimpeachable
characterization exists.38 A proper common law narrative
requires a balance between putting forth a shared history
that can shoulder the weight of serving as precedent and
noting the joints that lead different groups (libertarians and
egalitarians in this telling) to emphasize different aspects of
the narrative. Several specific examples will help to make
this clear.
A.

The Importance of Pre-World War I Activity
to the Libertarian Narrative

A typical version of the common law approach
focuses on the twentieth century and almost exclusively on
the Supreme Court. 39 It combines the core political speech
narrative that began with Schenck and Abrams and
culminated with Brandenburg with other key decisions
38 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 7-31.
39

Id. at 62-76.
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roughly contemporary with Brandenburg such as New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan40 and New York Times Co. v. United
States4 1 that expanded the reach of the clause's
protections.4 2 Nothing that happened prior to World War I
is examined in any detail.4 3
While the common law historical narrative can
plausibly begin with the World War I era, libertarians view
this narrative of the First Amendment's development as
historically truncated in its failure to acknowledge other
actors who sought to begin the historical narrative earlier.
By limiting itself only to a few important Supreme Court
cases that advanced the understanding of the First
Amendment, it erroneously treats the Supreme Court as the
sole source of this evolutionary process. While
contemporary understandings of the First Amendment's
development justifiably focus on the Supreme Court as a
leading protector of free speech rights, the Court's role is
the culmination of the evolutionary process that the
common law approach stresses and is neither a permanent
nor an exclusive feature of it. The common law narrative
tends to evince little skepticism of the Supreme Court's
role, even though the Court, pre-WWI, showed little
interest in hearing from those who sought to expand the
reach and understanding of the Free Speech Clause."
Thus, both on their own terms, and for the influence that
they had on subsequent arguments centering around more
40
41
42

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-56.

Strauss, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 44 ("The American
system of freedom of expression, as we know it, did not begin to
emerge as a coherent body of legal principles until well into the
twentieth century - in opinions written in a series of cases decided just
after World War I.").
44 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 15 ("Most dramatically, no group of
Americans was more hostile to free speech claims before World War I
than the judiciary, and no judges were more hostile than the justices on
the United States Supreme Court.").
43
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mainstream First Amendment disputes, the contributions of
so-called "libertarian radicalism" of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century should receive greater attention in
the common law narrative. 45
For example, while the Comstock Act finds few
defenders today, at the time of its implementation, the most
vociferous opposition came from libertarian radical
thinkers such as Theodore Schroeder and Gilbert Roe,
whose arguments were focused less on a framework of core
political speech than on opposing obscenity prosecutions. 46
The libertarian radical perspective was heavily influenced
by the abolitionist movement and was thus less inclined to
understand the Free Speech Clause as limited by a notion of
the public good.47 In this sense, libertarian radicals treated
the First Amendment "opportunistically."4 8 This desire to
expand the scope of the First Amendment, and the refusal
to defer to any established notion of the public interest, ran
counter to the Court's own preferences at the time. In short,
libertarian radicals presented a vision of the value of the
First Amendment different from the standard common law
account of the time, yet one that ultimately came to be
viewed as largely conventional.
Additionally, while Schroeder and Roe were outside
the mainstream that appealed to influential Justices such as
Holmes and Brandeis, the scholars who influenced these
Justices were, in fact, influenced by strains of the
libertarian radical perspective. 4 9 Furthermore, Schroeder
4 Id. at 23.
46 Id. at 27-74.
47 Id. at 28 ("For some social purists, including Anthony Comstock,
expressions of libertarian radical views about religion and sex were
examples of blasphemy and obscenity that should be suppressed in the
public interest.").
48 Schauer, supra note 6, at 191-93.
49 As Rabban demonstrates, Ernst Freund called Zechariah Chafee's
attention to Schroeder's work in a personal letter. See RABBAN, supra
note 10, at 303 n.13.
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and Roe helped advance what evolved to become a core
principle of free speech that seems not to have received
much attention from the common law perspective:
protection for free speech as a fundamental principle and
not just for specific parties, content areas, or manners of
expression.o This commitment found fullest expression in
Schroeder and Roe's work with the Free Speech League, a
forerunner to, and influence on, the American Civil
Liberties Union. 5 ' This advocacy included challenging the
era's standards for criminal libel through the Masses case,
well in advance of Sullivan, the case stressed by the
common law approach.5 2
These early stirrings helped shape the direction of
subsequent debates, both by expanding the range of profree speech arguments offered and by influencing the
generation of scholars who most influenced Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, Justices who are central to the more
standard common law narrative. An accounting of the
development of the First Amendment that fails to note
these contributions is one that risks misconstruing the
evolutionary process.
B.

Holmes, Hand, and Getting to Abrams

Just as the common law narrative can be too limited
when it excludes early work such as the contributions of
libertarian radicals, it can also be too confined when
It should go without saying that the common law approach should be
read to endorse this view, and the reason it goes unmentioned may well
be because it is so uncontroversial at the present. However, the point
remains that well before the Court came to enshrine this view, it was
being advanced by these libertarian radicals and that departures from
this broad principle are usually justified in egalitarian language.
5' RABBAN, supra note 10, at 57-76.
52 For a discussion on Masses, see id. at 71. For a discussion on
Sullivan, see STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-54,
73-75.
5o
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providing a reading of its own standard narrative, which
starts with Schenck and Abrams and ends with
Brandenburg and New York Times Co. v. United States.
Most specifically, by seeing the decisions in these latter
two cases as featuring a version of the clear and present
danger test, the common law perspective risks
oversimplifying what happened in between the former
two. 5 3 Even when the common law approach steps back
from too clean of a narrative, such as when it acknowledges
that there exists no single moment of inspiration for
defining what is protected free expression, it quickly
qualifies that claim by noting that this is true only because
Holmes' Abrams opinion was in dissent.5 4 However, the
reality is more contingent than this. Even if Holmes had
been writing for the Court, other moments, such as
Brandeis' subtly different celebration of First Amendment
values, might be favored from another narrative direction.
Furthermore, even if one were to accede to the
necessity of finding a single statement of free speech's
value to anchor the narrative account, and even if one were
to agree that Holmes' Abrams dissent is that statement, the
common law approach still must confront what appears to
be a significant shift in Holmes' own position, from writing
53 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 64 ("Holmes's

opinion asserted that the clear-and-present-danger test required the
government to show a high-probability risk of harm that is both
immediate and serious . . . . Versions of this test appear in the Pentagon

Papers case and in Brandenburg.").
54 Id. at 64-65.
5s Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH INTHE MODERN ERA, 73 (Lee C. Bollinger &

Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) ("Notwithstanding the magisterial
articulations of Justices Holmes, Roberts, Jackson, Black, Harlan, and
Brennan among others, if there is a single passage in the United States
Reports that best captures why the freedom of speech might be
considered the linchpin of the American constitutional regime, it is the
following paragraph from Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California")(footnotes omitted).
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for the Court in Schenck to his dissent in Abrams.56 In
Schenck, Holmes was troubled enough by the anti-war,
anti-conscription pamphlet that the defendants had been
handing out to invoke his famous example of "falsely
shouting fire in a theatre, and causing a panic . . . .";57
whereas in Abrams - mere months later - Holmes was

minimizing the threat posed by "the surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man." The
common law narrative may note the incongruity between
Holmes' statements, but it still tends to treat each as a step
in a logical progression.59
This retrospective view rationalizes Holmes'
statements, but it misses an opportunity to fully examine
the influences that may have led him to reconsider what he
wrote for the Court in Schenck. 60 While the common law
perspective never claims that Schenck and Abrams are
continuous, it minimizes the extent to which Schenck
represents a false start.6 1 It also ignores the extent to which

56

See, e.g.,

GEOFFREY STONE,

PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN

192-211 (2004).
5 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
5 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).
59 Strauss, Freedom of Speech, supra note 1, at 49 ("But as it happens,
the principle Holmes called for in the Abrams dissent is essentially
impossible to square with Schenck[,]" and "[i]n retrospect, it is possible
to understand what Holmes and Brandeis were doing, even though they
were not explicit about it at the time, nor even, probably, fully
conscious of it.").
60 STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 208 (2004) ("Although
the explanation for Holmes's sudden passion for the freedom of speech
remains a wonderful mystery, there can be little doubt that his reading
in the summer of 1919 and his discussions with [Learned] Hand,
[Zechariah] Chafee, and [Harold] Laski sparked a change in his
thinking.").
61 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA 138 (1988) ("We confront therefore a benign conspiracy.
With the advent of the Holmes eloquence in Abrams, Schenck is
infused with new vitality and Debs is conveniently forgotten. The
WARTIME
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Holmes' views announced in Schenck were consistent with
what Holmes had previously written, especially his opinion
in Patterson v. Colorado.62 Patterson is notable for how
narrowly it read the First Amendment, closely adhering to
Blackstone's view that the only significant restriction on
the government was a prohibition on prior restraints. 63
Thus, a less constrained narrative reveals that
Holmes, while still a major figure in the evolution of our
understanding of the First Amendment, was viewed as
advocating a cramped understanding of the First
Amendment by libertarian radical activists, numerous
scholars influenced by these activists, lower court judges
such as Learned Hand, and fellow members of the Supreme
Court, such as Justice Harlan in Patterson.64 Hand's
opinion in Masses is of particular relevance, both because it
offers a well-developed alternative to Holmes' viewpoint,
and, insofar as contemporary free speech standards are
viewed, as somewhat of a Holmes-Hand hybrid.
Just as Holmes would two years later in Schenck,
Hand was dealing with a prosecution under the Espionage
Act of 1917. However, Hand chose to focus more directly
and explicitly on what the illustrations and language in
question stated and not on any bad tendency that could be
imputed to the challenged expression. Hand combined this
emphasis on actual assertion - rather than estimating
consequences - with a careful construction of the statutory
language and reached an "extraordinarily speech-

tradition is read as though the Abrams dissent had in fact been the
opinion for the unanimous Court in Schenck.").
62 See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454
(1907).
63 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 130-34.
6 Id. at 134 ("Justice Harlan's dissent in Patterson contained a
vigorous, if undeveloped, defense of free speech under the First
Amendment. Harlan explicitly opposed Holmes's conclusion that the
First Amendment prevents only prior restraints."). See Patterson , 205
U.S. at 465.
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protective" interpretation of the 1917 law. 65 Hand's
decision distinguished between speech that could be
viewed as disloyal or unpatriotic but nonetheless
constitutional, and speech that expressly advocated illegal
activity which was not:
Yet to assimilate agitation, legitimate as
such, with direct incitement to violent
resistance, is to disregard the tolerance of all
methods of political agitation which in
normal times is a safeguard of free
government. The distinction is not a
scholastic subterfuge, but a hard-bought
acquisition in the fight for freedom, and the
purpose to disregard it must be evident when
the power exists. If one stops short of urging
upon others that it is their duty or their
interest to resist the law, it seems to me one
should not be held to have attempted to
cause its violation. 66
Hand chose such a speech-protective approach at great
potential risk to his own career.67 Unlike Holmes, who was
firmly ensconced on the highest court in the land, Hand
was hoping for a promotion to the court of appeals but was
passed over shortly after his Masses opinion was reversed
by the Second Circuit.68 It is easy to conclude that the

65 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE 128

(1994) [hereinafter GUNTHER , LEARNED HAND: THE MAN].

See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1917),
rev'd, 264 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
66

STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 165-66.
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 161; STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 169. See Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten,
67

68

246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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progress of free speech was slowed both by the reversal of
Masses and by Hand's being passed over. 69
Also worth noting is that this emphasis on Hand's
Masses decision is not a recent phenomenon. Hand's
importance, and the distinctiveness of his approach
compared to that of Holmes, has been noted for some
time.7 0 Indeed, in correspondence with and about Holmes,
Hand himself sought to articulate the specific differences
he saw between his and Holmes' approaches.'
Hand feared that more context-dependent tests
would lead to an interpretive morass born of the challenge
of offering precise boundaries to terms such as bad
tendency or clear and present danger. From this
perspective, the debate over whether Holmes announced a
new, stricter reading of clear and present danger in Abrams,
or whether the context of the fact pattern in Abrams explain
Holmes' decision to switch and vote to strike down a
conviction, is beside the point.72 What mattered to Hand
was that reliance on such standards permitted such
confusion. Instead, in his Masses opinion, Hand offered up
a clearer and more strongly speech-protective standard, one

The open judgeship went instead to Martin T. Manton, who viewed
Ulysses as obscene and was ultimately convicted of accepting bribes.
See GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 335-43,
503-13.
70 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719 (1975) [hereinafter Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins].
69

71 See RABBAN,

supra note 10, at 293-97; STONE, PERILOUS TIMES,

supra note 56, at 198-203; Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins,
supra note 70, at 732-50.
72 See STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56, at 192-95; GUNTHER,

supra note 65, at 140-41. As noted, such an argument also meshes well
with the similarities between Holmes' opinions in Schenck and
Patterson.
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that has been widely hailed, even if it is muted in standard
common law accounts.7 3
C.

The Common Law First Amendment is Both
Egalitarian and Libertarian

The current First Amendment standard Brandenburg's requirement of both the intent and
likelihood of producing "imminent lawless action" combines elements of both Hand and Holmes in a way that
is more speech-protective than the standards announced by
either individually. In this way, the culmination of the
common law evolution of the First Amendment contains
both egalitarian and libertarian components.
Even taken on its own, Holmes' perspective
combines egalitarian and libertarian elements. Insofar as his
Abrams dissent was consistent with the view of First
Amendment as "a negative check on government
tyranny," 74 it sought libertarian consequences. Thus,
viewed retrospectively, it is narrowly accurate to see in
Holmes a commitment to the libertarian vision.
However, Holmes' emphasis on the "competition of
the market" as the "best test of truth" is paired with his
understanding of the Constitution as "an experiment." 75
This view, consistent with the pragmatic strain of
progressive thought, treats free speech as crucial insofar as
a fair competition is crucial to societal advancement, and
not as a fundamental liberty possessed by individuals.
73 For accounts that acknowledge the importance of Masses, see
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN, supra note 65, at 151-163;
KALVEN, supra note 61, at 126-30; RABBAN, supra note 10, at 26166;WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME 175-178 (1998); STONE, PERILOUS TIMES, supra note 56,
at 165-70.
74 Sullivan, supra note 4, at 145.
7 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
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Compared to the libertarian radicals of the time, or even to
Hand's more absolute First Amendment standard, it is hard
to view Holmes' yosition as libertarian in any broader
sense of the term. Holmes' focus on the societal over the
individual is consistent with the general deference to
legislative enactments that marked his jurisprudence. 7
When combined with the contingencies implicit in his more
contextual clear and present danger standard, it is clear that
in a broader historical context, Holmes' approach was more
egalitarian than available alternatives.
Thus, while Brandenburg is among the most
absolute, speech-protective, libertarian statements of the
purpose of the First Amendment, it can still be placed in
notably different contexts depending on how its place in the
overall narrative is presented. Consider two different
statements of Brandenburg'simportance. The first implies
that Hand's Masses opinion is an equal partner to Holmes'
clear and present danger standard and proclaims
Brandenburgto be:
[The] clearest and most protective standard
under the [F]irst [A]mendment .

. .

. In one

sense, Brandenburg combines the most
protective ingredients of the Masses
incitement emphasis with the most useful
elements of the clear and present danger
Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN
AMERICA 65 (2001) ("The key to Holmes's civil liberties opinions is
76

the key to all his jurisprudence: it is that he thought only in terms of
aggregate social forces; he had no concern for the individual.").
77 Id. ("It is easy to see Holmes's concern for allowing democracy to
work its way, without peremptory restriction by courts, in his opinions
in cases involving economic issues... .But that concern is also at the
bottom of his opinions in the civil liberties cases . . . . Those were

ostensibly First Amendment disputes; but their real grounds were
economic. For in every case, the defendant was some kind of
socialist.").
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heritage . . . . Brandenburg is the most

speech-protective standard yet evolved by
the Supreme Court.7 8
The second opts not to mention Hand or Masses by
name and paints a picture of the core of clear and present
danger remaining, but being augmented by later decisions
with the following result:
Brandenburg was the product of two strands
of well-developed twentieth-century legal
evolution . . . . In Brandenburg, the Court

concluded that, although the HolmesBrandeis test captured something important
about the First Amendment, that test was not
sufficient by itself . . .. So in Brandenburg,

the Court combined the Holmes-Brandeis
line of precedents with Chaplinsky and
Yates-cases that emphasized the distinction
between high- and low-value speech.7 9
There is a broad commonality in these accounts, but
also significant differences. While the former attributes the
incitement element in Brandenburg to Hand's Masses
opinion, the latter derives it from later Supreme Court cases
and characterizes it as a distinction regarding the inherent
value of the speech. Thus, the first statement portrays
Brandenburg as a robust, maximally speech-protective
standard, whereas the latter presents Brandenburg as
substituting a better context-based consideration - highversus low-value speech - for Holmes' somewhat outdated
version. For a number of reasons - the relative dormancy
78 Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins,supra note 70, at 754-55.

79 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 72-73.
8o Id. at 73 ("The evidence for that conclusion [that clear and present
danger was insufficient] was the product of trial and error: specifically,
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of Chaplinsky's "fighting words" standard, 81 the expansion
of libel protections beyond Sullivan (another case stressed
by the common law approach 82), and the historical
importance of Hand's contributions 83 --there is, at least, a
compelling case to be made that the first account does a
better job of communicating the range covered by the
evolution of First Amendment doctrine in all of its fits and
starts. 84
Thus, while there is a shared core to varying
accounts of the First Amendment's common law
development, it can be presented with significant degrees
of libertarian-or egalitarian-directed emphasis. This is
also true with respect to free speech controversies outside
the range of core political speech. In their advocacy against
the Comstock Act, libertarian radicals invoked the First
Amendment in appealing obscenity convictions.ss
However, from a more egalitarian direction, obscenity is
low-value speech. 86 Of course, what was held to be obscene
under the Comstock Act is a far cry from the Warren
Court's line of obscenity cases. The common law account
needs to be augmented with a consideration of the
necessary opportunism of the First Amendment.

the use to which the test had been put in Dennis. In the crucible of
common law testing, clear and present danger collapsed too easily into
simple balancing of costs and benefits.").
8' See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
82 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53-54, 73-75.

83 See Gunther, Learned Handand the Origins,supra note 70; Geoffrey
R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A
Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 335 (2003). See also KALVEN,
supra note 61, at 125-30.
84 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 53 ("The story of

the emergence of the American constitutional law of free speech is a
story of evolution and precedent, trial and error-a demonstration of
how the living Constitution works.").

85 RABBAN, supra note 10, at 28-44.
86 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 54,
69.
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III.

The Necessary Opportunism of the Common
Law First Amendment

An oft-made criticism of the common law approach
is that it can wind up, by intended outcome or as the
consequence of rigid adherence to precedent, justifying
outcomes that never were intended by the original drafters
of the relevant text. While this taps into a much larger,
well-worn debate over constitutional interpretation, there is
a specific critique that is of particular relevance here. The
charge of First Amendment opportunism consists in the
claim that, likely owing to the reverence with which it is
held and its high likelihood of success, the First
Amendment has come to serve as a convenient lifeline for
arguments that may be more accurately anchored in other
legal theories, though likely with a lowered chance of
victory.8 7
This charge is made with some ambivalence.8 8 On
the one hand, opportunistic use of the First Amendment
raises several concerns, notably: potential negative
repercussions for the First Amendment as present, 89
misunderstandings of the First Amendment's intended
Schauer, supra note 6, at 175 ("In many respects, the culture of First
Amendment discourse and argument, both in the courtroom and in the
larger culture, exhibits many of the same features as being faced with
driving a nail with a pipe wrench. With surprising frequency, people
and organizations with a wide array of political goals find that society
has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically effective
8

argumentative tools they need to advance their goals . . . . And in

looking for these imperfect but usable tools, they often find that the
leading candidate is the First Amendment. Like the pipe wrench, the
First Amendment is frequently called on to do a job for which it is
poorly designed.").
Id. at 176 ("When people make do with whatever happens to be
available to them we call them 'opportunistic,' a word that hovers
precariously between the pejorative and the complimentary.").
9 Id. at 175 ([Under such opportunistic usage,] "the job gets done
poorly and the tool is damaged in the process.").
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purpose, 90 and weaknesses with the common law
approach. 9 1 On the other hand, such concerns would prove
ill-founded if no agreed upon understanding of the First
Amendment's intended purpose exists 92 and, thus, the
common law approach offers an accurate description. 93
When specific examples of First Amendment
opportunism are offered, the potential ambiguity is only
compounded. For instance, the example of campaign
finance reform may be opportunistic,94 but it may also be a
logical implication of the libertarian vision of the First
Amendment. 95 Or, more likely, it may be both.
As a strictly logical matter, one might temporarily
concede that there is an intended purpose of the First
Amendment. At the very least, this means that either the
libertarian or the egalitarian vision of the First Amendment
is opportunistic in a damaging way. In fact, such a
concession would likely imply that both visions are
Id. at 195 ("If First Amendment opportunism is as widespread as I
suspect, and as some of the documentation here may suggest, then the
First Amendment, precisely because of its cultural salience and
consequent empirical persuasiveness, may be especially vulnerable to
the kind of misuse and consequent distortion that I am suggesting ....
[It] may over time lose its ability to perform the function for which it
was originally designed.").
9' Id. at 192 ("All of this is of course the armchair sociology of
doctrinal evolution.").
92 Id. at 195 ("It may turn out that in the final analysis none of the
justifications for a distinct free-speech principle is sound, and the that
the First Amendment is revealed to be merely the raw material of
opportunism and nothing else.") (footnote omitted).
9 Id. at 196-97 ("[I]f instead we see the First Amendment as
intrinsically, fundamentally, or even just largely as an artifact of a
constitution that is itself a common-law document, then it would be
hard to make sense of the idea of the First Amendment, and arguably of
the idea of free speech, apart from what the courts have made of it, and
apart from the necessarily and nonproblematically opportunistic way of
common law.").
94 Id. at 188-90.
9 See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 157-58, 161-63, 167-77.
9
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negatively opportunistic. For example, one who believes
the First Amendment has an intended purpose is likely to
be suspicious of attempts to expand it to the realm of sexual
expression, whether it be in the service of libertarian
arguments on behalf of nude dancing,96 or egalitarian
arguments against First Amendment protection of
exploitive, objectifying pornography.
A narrower evaluation of opportunism in its
negative connotation should steer clear of controversies
that can better be described divided along libertarian versus
egalitarian lines. Such disputes are often framed by both
sides as arguments over which vision is truer to the
intended purpose of the First Amendment. To declare a pox
on both houses in such situations is to declare the necessity
of First Amendment opportunism on the cheap. There are
more sustained arguments against First Amendment
opportunism that must be addressed on a deeper level, ones
that are made against both visions of the First Amendment
and expressly in situations where those visions appear to

converge. 97
In recent years, two different anti-opportunism
arguments have been put forth by members of the Supreme
Court. One, Justice Thomas' concurrence in Morse v.
Frederick,98 fits comfortably within the view that
opportunism leads to the First Amendment being extended
beyond its intended purpose. The other, Justice Alito's
dissent in United States v. Stevens, 99 is less direct in citing
an original intended purpose of the First Amendment.
However, he still provides a considered argument against

96

Id. at 180-83, 191.

See id. at 163-67 (providing examples of points of convergence
between the libertarian and egalitarian visions).
98 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410-22 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
99 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592-1602 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
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the opportunism, or, frankly, the meta-opportunism he sees
in the Court's usage of the overbreadth doctrine.
While Alito's Stevens dissent is not the
first
instance of such an argument, it merits specific attention for
two different reasons. First, Alito's critique of a too lenient
application of the overbreadth doctrine is a part of his
general uneasiness over what he sees as the ever-expanding
scope of the First Amendment. In this way, his more recent
dissent in Snyder v. Phelps'00 further announces a
developing anti-opportunism distinct from either the
libertarian or egalitarian vision. Second, the logic of Alito's
Stevens dissent played a conspicuous role in Justice
Breyer's dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,01 suggesting that there exists an antiopportunism argument that could potentially appeal to
justices otherwise associated with competing First
Amendment visions. Each anti-opportunism argument will
be examined in turn.
A.

Justice Thomas' anti-opportunism

Justice Thomas' anti-opportunistic view of the First
Amendment develops out of his interpretive methodology,
which stresses the original public understanding of a
document.102 This view is consistent with his overall
100See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222-29 (2011) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
10'See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Assn., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2761-71 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
102 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410-11, 418-19 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("In my view, the history of public education suggests that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student speech
in public schools . .

.

. In my view, petitioners could prevail for a much

simpler reason: As originally understood, the Constitution does not
afford students a right to free speech in public schools."). See also
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2751, 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
decision today does not comport with the original public understanding
of the First Amendment

. . . . Admittedly, the original public
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constitutional jurisprudence and not limited to First
Amendment considerations.1 03 Thomas' approach leads
him to view appeals to stare decisis with considerable
skepticism and to express a readiness to overturn even
long-standing precedent if he believes it to be poorly

grounded.104
Such was the case in Morse v. Frederick, where
Thomas, in concurrence, announced his view that he would
go further than the Court's opinion and vote to overturn the
precedent set in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.105 To Thomas, Tinker
conflicted with the original understanding of the First
Amendment, which simply could not have been conceived
to protect free speech rights in a public education setting
given what the historical record reveals.106 Thomas'
opinion applies the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis, concluding that free speech rights in a public
school setting are virtually nonexistent.' 07
Though rather brief by contemporary standards,
Thomas' opinion has far-reaching implications. The fact
that respondent Frederick was not a minor at the time of the
controversy was "inconsequential" to Thomas because
understanding of a constitutional provision does not always comport
with modem sensibilities.").
103 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3072
(2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and in the judgment) ("When interpreting
constitutional text, the goal is to discern the most likely public
understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted.").
I Id. at 3062-63 ("I acknowledge the volume of precedents that have
been built upon the substantive due process framework, and I further
acknowledge the importance of stare decisis to the stability of the
Nation's legal system. But stare decisis is only an 'adjunct' of our duty
as judges to decide by our best lights what the Constitution means.")
(citation omitted).
105 Morse, 551 U.S. at 417-19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
o Id. at 416-19.
1o7 Id. at 413-19.
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"courts have applied the doctrine of in loco parentis
regardless of the student's age."o Further, though not
directly implicated by the case at hand, Thomas'
interpretation would potentially uphold denial of free
speech rights at the college level,109 imposition of corporal
punishment in public school settings," o and compelled
speech in public school settings.'i' Because of the absence
of constitutional protection for such speech, courts would
have less of a basis to scrutinize the rationale behind any
actions taken against students, and school administrators
would be free to punish students based on their readings on
the intent behind the speech.112
Concurrent with the specific elaboration of Thomas'
in loco parentis-based understanding, of the original public
understanding of the First Amendment in a public
education setting, is his view of the proper avenue for relief
should one find his opinion overly restrictive of free speech
rights in such a setting. In announcing that overlyrestrictive rules "can be challenged by parents in the
political process," Thomas is drawing a contrast with the
common law approach evidenced in Tinker, which
"substituted judicial oversight of the day-to-day affairs of
public schools."" 3 Clearly, regardless of how described,
whether as opportunism or adherence to common law
development, Justice Thomas forcefully opposes such an
approach. He believes the First Amendment has a "function

08

See id, at 413 n.3.
109 Id. at 412 n.2.
" 0 Id. at 414 n.4.
." Id. at 415 n.5.
112 Id. at 415, 419. (discussing Wooster v. Sunderland, 27 Cal. App. 51
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915)).
113 Id. at 420. See also id. at 421 ("Historically, courts reasoned that
only local school districts were entitled to make those calls. The Tinker
Court usurped that traditional authority for the judiciary.").
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for which it was originally designed"ll 4 and he is prepared
to limit its application accordingly.
Indeed, Thomas continues to apply his in loco
parentis-based reading outside of a public education
setting. In Brown v. EntertainmentMerchants Association,
Thomas declares that the First Amendment does not
include "a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to
access speech) without going through the minors' parents
or guardians."" 5 Going into more detail than he does in
Morse, Thomas lays out a detailed analysis of the historical
evidence regarding "the founding generation's views on
children and the parent-child relationship."" 6 This survey
leads Thomas to reiterate the conclusion he reached in
Morse, namely that "the Framers could not possibly have
understood 'the freedom of speech' to include an
unqualified right to speak to minors." 1 7
Consequently, as applied to the California ban on
video games sales to minors, Thomas would uphold the law
as exactly the type of action through the political process
that he believes to be the appropriate way of navigating the
contours of in loco parentis. The ban in question did not
seek to completely prohibit minor possession of violent
video games. Instead, it sought only to make sure that such
possession occurred only if a parent or guardian purchased
the game on the minor's behalf. Such a law, to Thomas, is
consistent with in loco parentis, and therefore, cannot be a
violation of the First Amendment.
Viewed together, one can see in Justice Thomas'
Morse and Brown opinions a clearly drawn understanding
of the original public understanding of the First
Amendment. This understanding would significantly limit
Schauer, supra note 6, at 195.
11 See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751(2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2752.
" Id. at 2759.
114
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the current reach of the First Amendment in cases
involving minors owing to the doctrine in loco parentis.
However, in cases not involving minors, Justice Thomas
can still support an expansive understanding of the First
Amendment's scope, one that can accurately be referred to
as libertarian when discussing Citizens United, for
example. The point is not that Thomas favors a broader or
narrower reading of the First Amendment, but rather that he
has announced a specific principle that can be characterized
as anti-opportunistic. His is not the only such principle,
however; and if Brown is any guide, it may well be Justice
Alito's approach that would have the best chance of
mustering a majority that counters the more typical
common law view.
B.

Justice Alito's Anti-opportunism

Justice Alito's approach is less rooted in the original
public understanding of the Framers." 8 Rather, Alito's
view, though anti-opportunistic in application, proceeds
from a distinction critical to the common law approach, the
distinction between high- and low-value speech."l 9 While
not a tacit endorsement of an egalitarian approach, Alito's
dissents in United States v. Stevens and Snyder v. Phelps
are strong critiques of a libertarian vision that would almost

"8 Indeed, Alito's concurrence in Morse v. Frederick endorsed the
value of Tinker as precedent and drew a clear contrast with Thomas'
concurrence. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito,
J., concurring) ("When public school authorities regulate student
speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in the shoes of
the students' parents. It is a dangerous fiction to pretend that parents
simply delegate their authority - including their authority to determine
what their children may say and hear - to public school authorities. It is
even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of authority
somehow strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the
State.").
Il9 STRAUSS, LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 54.
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reflexively strike down any enactment on First Amendment
grounds.
In Stevens, Alito notes that the specific intent of the
law in question was to prohibit "a form of depraved
entertainment that has no social value."' 20 He is particularly
critical of the majority's use of the overbreadth doctrine in
striking down a federal statute that prohibited the
production, sale, or possession of depictions of animal
cruelty. In his dissent, Alito makes a sustained criticism of
using overbreadth to strike down laws that he believes
would be upheld under an as-applied standard. In making
this criticism, Alito relates an excerpt from Board of
Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox that serves as a useful
one-sentence distillation of the anti-opportunism viewpoint:
"Ordinarily, the principal advantage of the overbreadth
doctrine for a litigant is that it enables him to benefit from
the statute's unlawful application to someone else."l21
Overbreadth has its applicability; it ought to be used as a
last resort, only in cases of "substantial" overbreadth
evidenced from "actual facts" showing a "realistic danger"
of the First Amendment being compromised.1 22
To heighten his low-value argument, Alito draws
most heavily on New York v. Ferber, the 1983 case in
which the Court held that child pornography, regardless of
whether the material is actually obscene, was of
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis" value and not
entitled to any First Amendment protection.123 Alito
provides several arguments as to the low value of the
depictions targeted by the statute and concludes that the
logic of Ferber should extend to the case in question.
120

See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (Alito, J.,

dissenting).
121 Id. at 1593 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y.
v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 483 (1989)).
122 Id. at 1594.
123 Id. at 1599 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762-63
(1982)).
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Alito extends this argument in Snyder v. Phelps.
Alone among the Justices, Alito believes the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IlIED) tort in question does
not run afoul of the First Amendment. Alito again
emphasizes the distinction between high- and low-value
speech, seeing no constitutional basis to protect speech that
"intentionally inflict[s] severe emotional injury on a private
person at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by
launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution

to public debate."l 24
Of particular note is Alito's contention that the
majority picks and chooses which expressions of the
Westboro Baptist Church to consider. He is chagrined that
the majority declined to consider an online account of the
church's picketing of Matthew Snyder's funeral.125 While
the Court claimed that is was a separate event from the
picketing itself and, therefore, not part of the HED tort,
Alito countered by noting that the Court had considered
previous protests by the church to further the majority's
view that the church's activities merited First Amendment
protection. Given that the online account "addressed the
Snyder family directly,"l 26 Alito notes that consideration of
it significantly strengthens that argument that a claim of
IED is justifiable. Implicit in Alito's dissent is the
assertion that the majority is being opportunistic in how it
determines which statements to consider and that their
opportunism is in service of extending First Amendment
protection beyond its proper scope. In contrast, Alito states
that he "fail[s] to see why actionable speech should be
immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech
that is protected." 27
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
125 Id. at 1225-26
n.15.
126 Id. at 1226.
127 Id. at 1227.
124
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Contrary to Thomas' anti-opportunism, Alito does
not attempt in either of his solitary dissents to announce
just what the original expectation of the First Amendment
was with respect to the particular controversy under
consideration. However, each dissent makes clear his
displeasure with the majority for inappropriately stretching
the First Amdendment-whether through application of the
overbreadth doctrine or through selective consideration of
statements-beyond its logically necessary range of
application. Perhaps because his criticism is not tethered to
an exact reading of the First Amendment's original
function, it has been subsequently adopted by another
justice in a way that Thomas' has not.
In his dissent in Brown v. EntertainmentMerchants
Association. Justice Breyer favorably cites Alito's Stevens
dissent when arguing that the Court has over-expansively
applied the First Amendment in striking down a California
prohibition on the sale of violent video games to minors.12 8
As noted previously, Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting
opinion in this case; one rooted in his in loco parentis view
of the original understanding of the First Amendment's
application with respect to minors. When Justice Breyer
announces that "the special First Amendment category I
find relevant is not (as the Court claims) the category of
'depictions of violence,' but rather the category of
'protection of children"' 1 29 he appears to concur with
Thomas' understanding of the specific issue. However, by
citing Alito's Stevens dissent, he is declining to endorse the
specific logic of Thomas' approach.
Also noteworthy about Breyer's dissent, however, is
that it directly responds to Justice Alito's concurrence.
128Brown

v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2762 (Breyer,
J.,
dissenting) ("A facial challenge to this statute based on the First
Amendment can succeed only if 'a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."') (citing Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587)).
129 Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, we are faced a situation where Breyer is tacitly
arguing that Justice Alito is not being faithful to his own
views. Certainly, this could be attributed to gamesmanship
on Breyer's part. However, Alito's concurrence also
indicates discomfort with the more expansive approach
taken by the Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court and is at
pains to stress that "[a]lthough the California statute is well
intentioned, its terms are not framed with the precision that
the Constitution demands, and I therefore agree with the
Court that this particular law cannot be sustained."l 30 Alito
shares Breyer's view that the majority is too quick to rely
on an expansive application of the First Amendment.
Rather than the "broad ground adopted by the Court,"
Justice Alito relies on the "narrower ground that the law's
definition of 'violent video game' is impermissibly
vague."'31
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Alito felt required
to concur, albeit on narrower grounds. While Breyer argued
that the California legislature acted appropriately in using
the Miller v. California'32 obscenity test as a guide in
crafting its law, Alito disagreed. The California law is a
regulation of "expression related to violence," a type of
prohibition with no long-standing history behind it. On the
other hand, Alito argues that "obscenity had long been
prohibited" by the time the Court turned its attention to it in
the 1960's.133 In other words, Alito's distinction is
predicated on there existing a common law understanding
of obscenity being outside the scope of First Amendment
protection in a way that violent expression is not.
Alito may introduce an anti-opportunism argument
in Stevens, but he does not believe it can override a settled

Id. at 2742.
131Id. (citations omitted).

130

132 See

generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

133 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2746 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at

484-85).
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common law understanding in the present case. Breyer
declined to join Alito's dissent in Stevens, joining instead
the majority's application of the overbreadth doctrine.
Thus, while barely a year old, Alito's anti-opportunism
argument in Stevens is already susceptible to the claim that
it is open to being used opportunistically. The problem of
First Amendment opportunism may be compared to using a
pipe wrench to drive a nail, but in reality it is not so simple
to identify. 134 Less a matter of using the wrong tool because
it is the only tool present, the various criticisms of the
Court's approach in Morse, Stevens, Snyder, Phelps, and
Brown is more akin to the claim that the Court used a
paring knife when it had a scalpel at its disposal. The
consequence is less that the First Amendment is misshapen
than that its boundaries are imprecise. However, under a
common law understanding, this is necessarily so, and not a
significant cause for despair.
Conclusion
The common law understanding of the First
Amendment is firmly entrenched. Brandenburg casts a tall
shadow and virtually any remotely controversial free
speech case turns on whether the contact is or is not located
within a proscribed category of speech and therefore
regulable. In other words, there exists a well-accepted
framework for talking about what free speech is. This is
appropriate.
Within this agreed upon framework, however, more
than one compelling narrative can operate. Egalitarian and
libertarian accounts will reach different conclusions about
when a category threshold has been breached. Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,135 ChristianLegal

134
13

Schauer. supra note 6.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Society v. Martinez,13 United States v. Williams, m and
United States v. Alvarezl38 are recent examples where these
accounts have led to a closely and strongly divided Court.
It is entirely likely that the common law First Amendment
will continue to evolve. However, there is little reason to
expect that evolution to alter the fundamental postBrandenburgunderstanding of the Free Speech Clause.
This is true in large part because the most
contemporary understandings of the First Amendment are
welcoming of opportunistic arguments that seek to add to
the range of communication and conduct that fit within its
protection. Where a case does not cut along explicit
libertarian/egalitarian lines, the Court has shown a clear
tendency to find in favor of the speaker. Put differently,
questions of whether the First Amendment has become too
opportunistic are judge-refereed and there is scant evidence
of a critical mass existing that would call into question the
present consensus as announced in cases such as Stevens,
Snyder, and Brown.

See Hastings Christian Fellowship v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010).
137 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285
(2008).
138 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
136
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